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Abstract
We examine the choice and the offer spreads between callable and noncallable bonds.We
find significant differences by industry sector and therefore segment our results by
financial and nonfinancial industries. For the financial sector, the popularity of callable
and noncallable bonds is significantly related to the economic environment. Financial and
high‐grade nonfinancial callable bonds are also more likely to be issued via a shelf
prospectus. Although firms that issue callable bonds do not consistently display the
characteristics associated with severe agency problems, the issue choice for below‐
investment‐grade nonfinancial and lower rated financial bonds, where we can expect
agency problems to be more severe, is more consistent with agency theory than is the
issue choice for higher rated bonds.
JEL Classification: G24, G32, G38, K12, K22
I. Introduction
In recent years, many observers have noted that the popularity of callable bonds is
declining. For example, Kalotay (2008) and Banko and Zhou (2010) observe that the
portion of callable bonds have been declining over the last 20 years and their popularity
has shifted toward the below‐investment‐grade segment of the corporate bond market.
However, no explanation is offered for this trend. In contrast, our more recent sample
finds that new issues of callable bonds are becoming increasingly popular. Figure I shows
that although only 20% of all newly issued, U.S. dollar, fixed‐coupon corporate bonds
were callable in 1995, year by year the popularity of callable bonds increased until 2006,
when the popularity of callable bonds again decreased.We do not knowwhy there is such
a variation in the choice between callable and noncallable bonds. Therefore, we develop a
set of hypotheses and test them in an attempt to explain why the popularity of call
provisions changes.
We gratefully acknowledge Kenneth Daniels, Demissew Ditro Ejara, Lei Zhou, and Mel Jamesson; the
seminar participants at Middlesex University, particularly Ephriam Clark and Yacine Belghitar; and the participants
of the 2013 Multinational Finance Society Conference in Izmir for their comments and suggestions. All remaining
errors are our own.
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A call option empowers the issuer to take advantage of bondholders by repaying
the debt in advance whenmarket yields decline.When interest rates decrease, the call price
is less than what the fair value of debt would have been absent the call option. Following
Kraus (1973), finance has rejected financial gain as an explanation for call provisions
because in an efficient market, gains to shareholders via refinancing at lower interest rates
would be anticipated and expropriated by bondholders in terms of the initial call provision.
Instead, Thatcher (1985), Kish and Livingston (1992), and Boreiko and Lombardo (2011)
suggest agency can explain the use of call provisions. Although earlier empirical studies
such as Crabbe andHelwege (1994) could not find empirical support for individual agency
theoretic explanations for callable bonds,more recentwork byBanko andZhou (2010) and
Chen, Mao, and Wang (2010) finds that call options are used to resolve a combination of
asymmetric information, underinvestment, and risk‐shifting agency problems.
Another argument suggests that some issuers can use callable bonds to hedge
interest rate risk. In fact, Banko and Zhou (2010) find some evidence of this for
investment‐grade callable bonds. Recently, Choi, Jameson, and Jung (2013) observe that
asymmetric information creates an incentive to issue callable debt even when market
conditions do not support a separating equilibrium. This happens because information
asymmetry that leads the market to overestimate the issuer’s default probability also leads
it to undervalue the call premium. Still, agency theoretic, asymmetric information, and
hedging rationales for call provisions do not provide an explanation for the time‐varying
popularity of callable bonds.
This raises several interesting questions. Are there any economic factors that can
explain the shifting popularity of callable bonds relative to noncallable bonds? If so, do
firms that issue callable bonds take into account these factors and does this influence the
preferred practice of issuing callable bonds?Do firms that issue callable bonds display any
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Figure I. Proportion of All Newly Issued, U.S. Dollar, Fixed‐Coupon Corporate Callable and Noncallable
Bonds by Year from 1995 to 2007.
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characteristics associated with agency problems? Finally, do issuers pay a premium for
the call feature?
This article is related to a series of studies that examine the motivation and offer
spreads of different types of callable bonds. Daniels, Diro Ejara, and Vijayakumar (2009)
examine themotivation and offer spreads of bond clawbacks, and Nayar and Stock (2008)
study make‐whole bonds. Clawbacks and make‐whole bonds are special types of callable
bonds that restrict the refunding of callable bonds to issues of equity (clawbacks) or
adjusts the call price at the date of call (make‐whole). Banko and Zhou (2010) revisit the
agency theoretic explanations for callable bonds, and Chen, Mao, and Wang (2010)
examine the refunding behavior of callable bonds. We add to this body of work by
examining the time‐varying popularity of ordinary callable bonds and the influence that
the issue process, bond covenants, and economic environment have on the offer spread for
callable and noncallable bonds and on the value of call premiums. Unlike most studies in
this area, we include financial firms as a larger number of callable bonds are issued by
financial firms than by industrial and utility bonds combined during our 1995–2008
sample period. We also include financial bonds in our sample because we wish to
determine whether the financing of financial firms is subject to the same agency theoretic
problems as industrial firms.
Other work includes the influence of the economic environment on the popularity
of callable bonds, but evidence is fragmentary and contradictory. For example, Kish and
Livingston (1992), Güntay, Prabhala, and Unal (2002), and Banko and Zhou (2010) find
that the popularity is increasing, but Sarkar (2001) finds that the popularity of a call feature
is decreasing in the level of interest rates. However, all of this work occurs during the time
the call feature was being reengineered through the introduction of make‐whole and
clawback refinements to the call feature (see Goyal, Gollapudi, and Ogden 1998; Nayar
and Stock 2008). Moreover, none of this work accounts for the full range of interest rate
and credit risk environment variables. In contrast, we examine the impact of the economic
environment by including proxies for the level, slope, and interest rate volatility of the
term structure of interest rates, as well as the credit spread, on a large sample of financial
and nonfinancial, callable and noncallable bonds, culled of make‐whole, clawback,
preferred share, convertible, and put features.
We find that the motivation for issuing callable versus noncallable bonds varies
by industry. Controlling for annual time effects, we discover that the popularity of callable
bonds relative to noncallable bonds is related to the economic environment more for
financial than nonfinancial firms. Specifically, the likelihood of new issues of
callable bonds decreases in the level and slope of the term structure and in the credit
spread for financial bonds. In contrast, the likelihood of nonfinancial callable bonds
decreases in the credit spread only. As noted earlier, some authors find that the popularity
of the call feature increases in interest rates. These different results can be related to
the cost of the call feature as, consistent with option pricing theory, we find that call
premiums rise with interest rates and with interest rate volatility. Therefore, as the level
and volatility of the term structure rise, the cost of a call feature rises so that new issuers
can reconsider their choice to issue a callable bond based on the changing trade‐off
between the increased cost of the call feature and the hedging benefit of calling if interest
rates later fall.
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Because we find evidence that the demand for callable bonds is not random, it
follows that firms can adjust the issuing process to take advantage of changes in the
economic environment if these changes matter to them. We find that all financial and
higher and medium investment credit grades of nonfinancial firms are more likely to issue
callable bonds using institutional arrangements that allow them to conveniently issue
callable bonds in response to changes in the economic environment. However, after
correcting for self‐selection bias, we find that issuers of financial callable bonds pay
around 48 basis points more relative to noncallable bonds for the option to call a bond
before maturity. Moreover, the call premium rises with the level of interest rates,
volatility, and maturity but falls with improvements in credit rating. Clearly, our results
support Kraus (1973) in that issuers of callable bonds do not appear to save on interest
costs by issuing callable bonds.
We find mixed evidence that firms use callable bonds to deal with agency
problems. On the one hand, lower rated and less profitable financial firms and lower rated
nonfinancial firms, the types of firms most likely to experience severe agency problems,
are more likely to issue callable bonds. On the other hand, callable bonds are also more
likely to be issued by more profitable nonfinancial firms, a type of firm not normally
thought of as subject to severe agency problems. We find similar mixed evidence in the
literature. Consistent with agency theory, Banko and Zhou (2010) and Kish and
Livingston (1992) find that smaller and lower rated bonds are more likely to contain a call
feature, but inconsistent with agency theory and consistent with our results, Banko and
Zhou find that more profitable firms, particularly those with a moderate rating, are more
likely to issue callable bonds. We go one step further than the literature and include
proxies for restrictive and security covenants that can potentially address agency
problems. Consistent with agency theory, callable nonfinancial bonds are more likely to
contain restrictive covenants. In contrast, financial callable bonds, though likely to
include enhanced security provisions, are also unlikely to contain restrictive covenants.
When examined by broad credit classes, we find more consistent support for agency
theory for below‐investment‐grade nonfinancial bonds and lower rated financial bonds,
the type of bond that is most subject to severe agency problems. Specifically, for below‐
investment‐grade nonfinancial bonds, smaller firms aremore likely to issue callable bonds
with restrictive covenants. Similarly, for lower rated financial bonds, less profitable firms
are more likely to issue callable bonds with enhanced security covenants. Still, there is a
slight flaw in this conclusion in that for both sets of firms, callable bonds are more likely
issued via a competitive than a negotiation process, suggesting there are investors that are
sanguine about agency issues.
II. Reasons for Issuing a Callable Bond
We do not know why the popularity of call provisions varies through time. Clearly, there
is more to the dynamics of the callable bondmarket that we can explain. Below, we divide
our hypotheses concerning callable bonds into two sets: those based on the economic
environment and those based on agency problems. Table 1 provides a summary of our
hypotheses.
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Economic Environment
Changes in the economic environment can explain the time‐varying popularity of callable
versus noncallable bonds because changes in the level, slope, and volatility of the term
structure and changes in the credit spread imply that the costs and benefits of call
provisions can vary. As we later show, a rise in the level of interest rates increases the
value of the call option embedded in the callable bond, making new issues of callable
bonds more expensive. Therefore, as interest rates rise, callable bond issues are
discouraged as call premiums rise. Alternatively, the call feature can be used to hedge
interest rate risk. If interest rates mean revert, the potential that interest rates will fall and
the bond will be called over the life of the bond increases as interest rates increase.
Consequently, as interest rates increase, the popularity of call features will rise as more
firms are likely to benefit from calling them before maturity. As a result, we cannot sign
the relation between the level of interest rates and the popularity of the call feature as the
relation will depend on two offsetting factors. As interest rates rise, call features will be
more costly but can also be more beneficial for hedging interest rate risk.
Fama (1984), Hardouvelis (1988), and Mishkin (1988) all find that increases in
forward rates are associated with higher future spot rates of interest. Estrella and Mishkin
(1997) find that increases in the slope of the term structure are associated with increases in
anticipated inflation. Estrella andMishkin (1998) and Ang, Piazzesi, andWei (2006) also
find that decreases in the slope of the term structure foreshadow poor economic
conditions. This suggests that an increase in the slope of the term structure, signaling a rise
in forward rates, can foreshadow economic events that can lead to a rise in interest rates.
Therefore, as the slope of the term structure rises, callable bond issues can be less popular
as fewer firms expect to benefit by calling them.
As we later show, a rise in interest rate volatility increases the value of the call
option embedded in the callable bond, making new issues of callable bonds more
expensive. Therefore, as interest rate volatility rises, callable bond issues are discouraged
TABLE 1. Summary of Hypotheses.
Factors/Variables Callable Bonds
Economic environment
LEVEL Positive/negative
SLOPE Negative
VOLATILITY Positive/negative
CREDIT SPREAD Negative
SHELF Positive
Agency
PRIVATE Positive
SIZE Negative
ROA Negative
RATING Negative
SECURITY Positive
RESTRICT Positive
COMPETITIVE Negative
Note: The hypothesized relations between bond issue characteristics and issues of ordinary callable and noncallable
bonds.
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as call premiums rise. Similar to the interest rate level, however, higher volatility also
increases the hedging potential for call provisions. Again, therefore, we are unable to sign
this relation as it depends on the trade‐off between the cost and the potential hedging
benefit of the call provision.
Callable bonds can benefit from a narrowing of the credit spread because if
corporate bond yields fall as credit conditions improve, the option to call moves toward
being in the money. Van Horne (2001) suggests there is a credit cycle that is related to the
economic cycle. Moreover, Martell (2008) finds that domestic corporate spreads are
related to a lagged component of sovereign spreads. This implies that as credit spreads
widen (narrow), calling the bond is unlikely (likely) as credit conditions weaken
(strengthen) and so callable bonds are less (more) popular as issuers are unlikely (likely)
to benefit.
Shelf‐registered bonds are those that can be issued conveniently in response to
market events as most of the detailed information requirements are already filed with
regulatory authorities. If firms wish to respond to economic conditions, their ability to do
so will be enhanced by employing shelf‐registered bonds. As we suggest above, changes
in the economic environment can influence the decision to issue a callable bond.
Therefore, if changes in the economic environment do influence the choice for issuing a
callable bond, firms are likely to issue callable bonds via shelf registration.
Agency Problems
It is well noted in the literature (see, e.g., Thatcher 1985; Robbins and Schatzberg 1986;
Kish and Livingston 1992; Boreiko and Lombardo 2011) that small, modestly profitable,
low‐credit‐rating firms suffer from agency problems. Therefore, if callable bonds are used
to alleviate agency problems, these small, low‐profit, and low‐credit‐rating firms will
favor callable bonds. Kwan and Carleton (2010) also find that small, lower rated firms
include restrictive covenants in bond issues and are more likely to issue bonds privately.
As small, low‐profit, and low‐credit‐rating firms will likely have restrictive access to
capital because of agency problems, we expect that when they issue callable bonds they
will likely issue them privately. Because investors in bonds of small, low‐profit, and low‐
credit‐rating firms likely require higher security and restrictive covenants to protect their
investment from agency problems, we expect that callable bonds will likely contain
restrictive and high‐security covenants. As this suggests that the callable bond contract is
complex, new issues of callable bonds are likely to be sold via negotiation rather than
competitive bid.1
1Bonds sold by negotiation are underwritten issues where the lead underwriter often commits to a fixed selling
price and attempts to profit from the difference between the price paid to the issuer and the price paid to eventual
investors. Bonds sold by competitive bids are sold to a successful underwriter from among several who submit
sealed bids. Competitive bids can lower the all‐in cost of issuing debt if there is a lot of interest from potential
underwriters. One method of encouraging interest from potential underwriters is to simplify the bond prospectus.
Hence, the choice between negotiated and competitive bid issues can be related to the choice between detailed,
complex contract terms tailored to a given firm’s circumstance and a simplified prospectus to encourage active
bidding to reduce issuing costs.
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III. Data Selection
Weuse theMergent’s Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). The FISD consists of
detailed cross‐sectional information on issue characteristics of all bonds the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) had on its books as of January 1, 1995,
and all bonds that it bought up to and including May 27, 2008. Each of the approximately
100,000 bond issues is identified by its international securities identification number
(ISIN) and includes information on the maturity date, offering date, rating date, rating,
rating type, broad industry category, and type of call provision.
From the FISD, we select all bonds that were issued on or after January 1, 1995,
because before that date the NAIC had to backdate old issues to add them to the database.
It is possible that bonds that matured before January 1, 1995, were not included so use of
these backdated bondsmay introduce unknown survivorship bias.We select all bonds that
belong to the industrial, financial, and utility industries and eliminate Treasuries, other
government and agency bonds, and preferred shares. Therefore, our sample contains
corporate bonds only. We select only fixed‐coupon bonds as we wish to concentrate on
the straightforward choice between callable and noncallable bonds. On examining these
corporate bonds for rating type, we find that Duff & Phelps do not rate many bonds within
each rating category. Moreover, virtually all bonds rated by Duff & Phelps are also rated
by one of the other mainstream rating agencies, so we disregard Duff & Phelps ratings.
However, we consider all Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch rated bonds
because they rate a large number of bonds in all industry categories.2We keep only bonds
with a rating date within one year of the offering date to ensure that the bond under study
has the same rating it had on the date it was offered. To report the characteristics of the
sample by rating we convert S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch letter ratings into numerical
equivalents from 21 (AAA) to 1 (C or D).3
From this initial selection of bonds, we select two subsamples: ordinary callable
bonds and noncallable bonds. Ordinary callable bonds are flagged as callable but do not
contain a put, conversion, make‐whole, or claw‐back provision. Similarly, noncallable
bonds do not contain any of these provisions including an ordinary call provision.4 We
note that convertible bonds can be used to deal with agency problems, and in fact Daniels,
Diro Ejara, and Vijayakumar (2009) find evidence to support this assertion. Other types of
call features such as make‐whole and clawback are studied by Goyal, Gollapudi, and
2We disregard bonds that were not rated as only very few bonds, fewer than 20, have no rating by one of the
three rating agencies, and it is not clear how these bonds can be included in later regressions where the credit ranking
appears as a key independent variable.
3All rating agencies have an almost identical rating system with eight broad rating categories, six of which are
subdivided into three shades of ratings. At the lower end there appears to be a minor deviation where S&P has one
lower rating D and Fitch has two additional lower ratings of DD andDDD thanMoody’s so that in totalMoody’s has
21, S&P 22, and Fitch 24 ratings. However this deviation is minor as very few bonds have a rating of D, DD, or DDD
within one year of issue so we simply assign the same numerical rating of 1 toMoody’s rating of C, S&P’s ratings of
C and D, and Fitch’s ratings of C, D, DD, and DDD.
4Make‐whole and clawback bonds contain special call provisions that restrict the conditions and price on
which a callable bond can be called. For details, see Goyal, Golapudi, and Ogden (1998) and Nayar and Stock
(2008).We delete approximately 4,500 bonds from our sample that contain amake‐whole, clawback, convertible, or
put provision to ensure we are dealing with pure types of ordinary callable or noncallable bonds.
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Ogden (1998), Powers and Sarkar (2006), Nayar and Stock (2008), and Daniels, Diro
Ejara, and Vijayakumar (2009). We are interested in whether ordinary call features are
related to changes in economic circumstances and we have nothing to add concerning the
use of convertible, make‐whole, or clawback bonds. We disregard these securities as they
are complex, sometimes containing a put feature and typically containing an ordinary call
feature, making it difficult to separate the motivations for including ordinary call features
in convertible, make‐whole, and clawback bonds and obscuring the relation between
changes in the economic environment and the popularity of issues of ordinary callable
bonds.
We then collect additional security‐specific information such as the offer spread
and match the security’s CUSIP with the issuing firm to collect company data, such as the
return on assets, for the year the security was offered. These selection procedures leave a
total sample of 5,776 bonds consisting of 2,748 ordinary callable (hereafter callable) and
3,028 noncallable bonds. We note that this sample size is comparable to other recent
studies investigating bonds using the FISD including Daniels, Diro Ejara, and
Vijayakumar (2009), 6,978 bonds; Banko and Zhou (2010), 2,109 bonds; and Nayar
and Stock (2008), 336 bonds. Table 2 reports the details of the callable and noncallable
bond subsamples.
TABLE 2a. Cross‐Sectional Sample Characteristics.
Grade
Industrial Utility Financial
Grand
Total
Ordinary
Call Noncallable Subtotal
Ordinary
Call Noncallable Subtotal
Ordinary
Call Noncallable Subtotal
AAA 167 81 248 12 23 35 104 79 183 466
AAþ 0 14 14 0 0 0 24 40 64 78
AA 5 70 75 0 2 2 265 16 281 358
AA– 18 101 119 3 27 30 119 27 146 295
Aþ 5 128 133 6 33 39 32 281 313 485
A 247 160 407 5 78 83 763 79 842 1,332
A– 3 237 240 0 77 77 180 259 439 756
BBBþ 3 226 229 2 74 76 127 60 187 492
BBB 5 211 216 4 50 54 235 208 443 713
BBB– 3 103 106 2 26 28 171 19 190 324
BBþ 9 67 76 0 5 5 28 7 35 116
BB 12 45 57 0 3 3 21 2 23 83
BB– 22 31 53 0 4 4 2 4 6 63
Bþ 34 28 62 1 6 7 6 6 12 81
B 45 15 60 1 2 3 6 1 7 70
B– 33 8 41 0 2 2 3 0 3 46
CCCþ 10 2 12 0 1 1 1 0 1 14
CCC 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
CCC– 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
CC 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 625 1,527 2,152 36 413 449 2,087 1,088 3,175 5,776
Rating A– A– A– Aþ A– A– A A A A–
Maturity 15.55 9.31 11.12 24.77 11.60 12.65 14.00 4.58 10.77 11.05
Note: This table reports the number of bond issues by industry, type, and rating from January 1, 1995, to May 8,
2008.
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Table 2a reveals three notable characteristics of our sample of callable and
noncallable bonds. First, examining the subsamples of bonds by industry, we note that
although callable and noncallable bonds are popular in all industries, there is a noticeable
concentration of callable bonds in the financial industry. With the exception of Kish and
Livingston (1992), most studies of callable bonds neglect callable financial bonds.
Second, except for the utility industry, callable and noncallable bonds have the same
average ratings, both being somewhat higher in the finance sector and somewhat lower in
the industrial sector. Even in the utility industry, the difference in the average rating is
minor, callable bonds having a somewhat lower average rating of A– and noncallable
bonds having a higher rating of Aþ. Third, we note that in all industries, noncallable
bonds tend to have much shorter scheduled maturities than their callable bond
counterparts. Because the actual maturity of callable bonds is likely to be shorter than the
scheduled maturity, one should be cautious in drawing conclusions about differences in
scheduled maturity.
Table 2b reports the time‐series characteristics of our sample. Issue activity
remained steady until about the second half of 2007 when there were fewer issues of
callable and noncallable bonds. The number of new issues of industrial callable bonds
increased in 2001 and remained a popular funding choice for industrial bonds until 2007.
Similar trends are seen for new issues of financial callable bonds except that callable
bonds became more popular two years earlier and in most years there were very few
below‐investment‐grade financial callable bonds.
Table 2c reports the characteristics of the firms that issued callable and
noncallable bonds in our sample. Although there is no obvious time trend in the
TABLE 2b. Time‐Series Bond Sample Characteristics.
Year
Industrial Utility Financial
Total
NC Callable NC Callable NC Callable
IG BIG IG BIG IG BIG IG BIG IG BIG IG BIG
1995 215 10 15 9 62 0 8 0 129 0 26 0 474
1996 168 31 7 31 37 1 4 1 81 1 24 2 388
1997 134 28 4 25 57 1 3 0 80 8 29 17 386
1998 173 29 7 12 52 1 4 0 110 0 50 2 440
1999 128 11 4 8 29 0 1 0 125 3 100 1 410
2000 76 6 4 2 32 5 4 0 64 2 106 0 301
2001 174 16 65 15 47 0 1 0 160 2 88 0 568
2002 90 9 46 7 24 0 7 0 104 0 294 2 583
2003 44 16 107 26 17 1 1 0 89 0 433 3 737
2004 28 14 78 10 8 3 0 1 51 2 429 1 625
2005 40 15 38 14 10 2 0 0 30 1 165 35 350
2006 27 7 55 9 8 6 1 0 25 0 158 0 296
2007 28 4 26 1 6 2 0 0 19 1 118 4 209
2008 6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Total 1,331 196 456 169 390 23 34 2 1,068 20 2,020 67 5,776
Note: This table reports the number of bond issues by industry, type, and rating from January 1, 1995, to May 8,
2008. NC refers to the number of noncallable bonds, IG refers to the number of investment‐grade bonds, and BIG
refers to the number of below‐investment‐grade bonds.
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characteristics of the firms by industry, it is clear that, on average, financial firms are
larger, have more debt, are less liquid, and are less profitable than nonfinancial firms.
These industry differences motivate us to investigate separately financial bonds and
nonfinancial bonds.
IV. Model Development
The FISD contains variables that indicate the presence of the full range of bond covenants
including restrictive bond features and the security level. There is also an indicator for
whether the bond was sold by competitive bids or by negotiation. As bond market and
company‐level data are not available from the FISD, we employ three additional sources
of information. Treasury market information is collected from the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York and other bond market information is collected from Datastream. We also
collect company‐level information from Bloomberg. The Bloomberg database contains
financial statement information that can be linked to the FISD bond information via the
nine‐digit CUSIP numbers.5
TABLE 2c. Firm Sample Characteristics.
Year
Nonfinancial Financial
Size DR QR ROA Rating Size DR QR ROA Rating
1995 11,861 29.61 0.61 4.78 BBBþ 299,031 43.98 0.88 3.29 A
1996 21,057 33.23 0.80 4.73 BBBþ 131,785 51.48 1.69 4.17 A
1997 98,285 34.81 0.72 5.15 BBBþ 139,256 44.82 1.08 2.73 BBBþ
1998 187,100 32.80 0.68 5.23 BBBþ 370,368 45.97 0.80 2.71 A
1999 111,475 35.57 0.80 4.78 A– 1,478,999 49.72 0.85 2.39 A
2000 98,742 33.74 0.70 5.06 A– 1,256,054 61.97 1.05 1.71 A
2001 79,774 29.72 0.80 6.70 A 1,048,724 52.68 0.87 3.01 A
2002 32,811 32.59 0.79 6.35 Aþ 675,351 63.45 5.93 1.10 A–
2003 186,533 47.09 1.56 5.14 A 253,553 53.52 2.00 1.39 A
2004 1,079,728 60.85 15.75 4.03 A– 399,534 43.73 1.41 0.84 A
2005 828,759 54.44 7.99 4.66 BBBþ 778,090 51.27 2.72 1.16 BBBþ
2006 1,154,330 68.76 14.61 3.60 A– 1,637,735 41.47 1.61 1.14 AA–
2007 304,852 46.87 1.62 5.79 A 3,607,091 22.39 1.02 1.24 AA–
2008 9,911,514 30.44 0.65 5.66 BBBþ 12,036,500 32.79 0.80 5.23 Aþ
Grand total 258,513 38.10 2.58 5.18 A– 805,063 49.85 2.00 1.76 A
Note: This table reports the characteristics of bond issues by industry, type, and rating from January 1, 1995, to
May 8, 2008. All statistics are equally weighted averages for the issue year. Size is based on actual nominal values in
thousands of dollars. The debt ratio is the total‐debt‐to‐total‐assets ratio, the quick ratio (QR) is the ratio of current
assets (excluding inventories) to current liabilities, and ROA is the return on assets. Except for the QR, all financial
ratios are expressed in percent.
5 In performing the match of the Bloomberg data with the FISD database we gratefully acknowledge expert
help from the staff of Bloomberg data. All of the subsequent matches made by CUSIPs were double checked by
matching company names.
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We collect the 1‐ and 10‐year constant maturity Treasury interest rates from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Table H15. We proxy the level of the term
structure as the 1‐year rate and the slope of the term structure as the difference between
the 10‐year and 1‐year constant maturity rates. Figure II reports that during the 1995–
2008 sample period, there appears to be two interest rate cycles pivoting around 2000 and
2007 where the level of interest rates achieved a peak and the slope began to increase
during the year.
We collect at the money five‐year cap rates and the yield on the Merrill Lynch
high‐yield index from Datastream. At‐the‐money caps represent the implied volatility
from five‐year interest rate caps and are our proxy for interest rate volatility. The
difference between the yield on the Merrill Lynch high‐yield index and the one‐year
Treasury rate is our proxy for the credit spread on the bond market.
We wish to determine the variables that influence the popularity of callable
bonds and the offer spread of callable and noncallable bonds. As we discuss in Section II,
firms can self‐select callable bonds according to the economic environment and
agency problems hypotheses so we must adjust our inquiry for self‐selection bias.
Heckman (1979) provides the methodology for dealing with self‐selection bias by
treating the problem as a case of an omitted variable. We follow Heckman’s two‐stage
procedure by first running a probit selection equation to extract the inverse Mills ratio
and then use the inverse Mills ratio as an independent variable in an offer spread
regression. The inverse Mills ratio then proxies for the unexplained factors that led
to the selection of a given bond type, thereby accounting for the influence of self‐
selection.
Our selection equation investigates determinates of the popularity of callable
bonds relative to noncallable bonds, and the offer spread equation, corrected for self‐
selection bias, investigates determinates of the offer spread of bonds. The selection
equation is:
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Figure II. Level and Slope of the Treasury Term Structure As Depicted by the 1‐Year and the Difference
between 10‐Year and 1‐Year Treasury Yields As Reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Table H15.
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PðCB ¼ 1Þi ¼ FðConstantþ LEVELi þ SLOPEi þ VOLATILITYi
þCREDIT SPREADi þ SHELFi þ PRIVATEi þ SIZEi þ ROAi
þRATINGi þ SECURITYi þ RESTRICTi þ COMPETITIVEi
þ ISSUE AMOUNTi þMATURITYi þ YXXi þ eiÞ; ð1Þ
where i refers to a given bond and CB equals 1 if the bond is callable, and 0 otherwise. All
variables are defined in Table 3 and, except for ISSUE AMOUNT, MATURITY, and
YXX, are designed to test our hypotheses discussed in Section II and summarized in
Table 1. The control variables ISSUE AMOUNT and MATURITY are included in the
selection equation because the amount and maturity of an issue can have a bearing on
TABLE 3. Variables and Definitions.
Variable Definition
OFFER SPREAD Offer yield less yield on a comparable maturity Treasury bond
Economic environment
LEVEL 1‐year Treasury yield
SLOPE Difference between the 10‐year and 1‐year Treasury interest rates
VOLATILITY Interest rate implied volatility as measured by 5‐year at‐the‐money caps
CREDIT SPREAD Credit spread as measured by the difference between the average yield on the
Merrill Lynch high‐yield index and the 1‐year Treasury yield
SHELF Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond is a shelf‐registered bond according to
Rule 415, and 0 otherwise
Agency
PRIVATE Dummy variable that equals 1 is the bond is a private Rule 144a issue, and 0
otherwise
SIZE Log of the issuing company’s assets
ROA Return on assets of the issuing company expressed in percent
RATING 21‐point rating scale where AAA is 21, AAþ is 20, and so on until CCC– is 3,
CC is 2, and C/D is 1
SECURITY Coded from 1 to 7 in increasing order of security: junior subordinate (7), junior
(6), subordinate (5), none (4), senior subordinate (3), senior (2), senior secure
(1)
RESTRICT Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond contains a company or subsidiary
restrictive covenant or a bond protective covenant, and 0 otherwise
COMPETITIVE Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issue sale was competitive, and 0
otherwise
Control variables/variables unique to the offer spread equation
ISSUE AMOUNT Log of the dollar amount of the bond issue
MATURITY Log of the number of days a bond is scheduled to mature as of the date of issue
TDR Total debt ratio of the issuing company, expressed in percent
QR Quick liquidity ratio of the issuing company
FINANCIAL Dummy variable that equals 1 if the company issuing the bond was in the
finance industry, and 0 otherwise
UTILITY Dummy variable that equals 1 if the company issuing the bond was in the utility
industry, and 0 otherwise
CALLABLE Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond is callable, and 0 otherwise
MILLSOC Inverse Mills ratio for ordinary callable bonds
YXX Dummy variable that equals 1 for observations of a given year, and 0 otherwise;
XX refers to the year in question, i.e., XX¼ 96 for the year 1996
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whether a callable or noncallable bond issue is chosen.We include annual dummies YXX
to control for time‐series effects evident in Figure II for all years except the 2000 and 2007
pivot years and 2008 as there are very few observations for that year. We estimate (1)
using maximum likelihood probit regressions for the full sample of 5,776 observations.
The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and we extract the inverse Mills
ratio from (1).
The offer spread equation contains the variables that we expect to determine the
offer spread:
ðY i  YmÞ ¼ Constantþ bSECURITYi þ bRESTRICTi þ bRATINGi
þbSHELFi þ bPRIVATEi þ bCOMPETITIVEi þ bSIZEi
þbTDRi þ bQRi þ bROAi þ bLEVELi þ bSLOPEi
þbVOLATILITYi þ bCREDIT SPREADi
þbCALLABLEi þ bMILLSOCi þ bYXXi þ ei: ð2Þ
The dependent variable (Yi – Ym) is the offer spread, which is the difference
between the offering yield for a given corporate bond i and the yield on corresponding
maturity m Treasury bond, and MILLSOC is the estimated inverse Mills ratio from (1).
We include a dummy variable CALLABLE that equals 1 if the bond is callable, and 0
otherwise. The coefficient of CALLABLE measures the extra yield required by a callable
relative to a noncallable bond once the effect of self‐selection is accounted for. Kraus
(1973) suggests this coefficient will be positive.
V. Selection and Offer Spreads of Financial Bonds
With the exception of Kish and Livingston (1992), no other researchers that we are aware
of include financial bonds in their sample. Kish and Livingston find that dummy variables
for FINANCIAL and UTILITY bonds are insignificant, implying that including these
different types of bonds in their sample is innocuous. As shown in Table 2c, however,
financial firms are distinct from nonfinancial firms so we separately examine financial and
nonfinancial bonds.
Table 4 reports the result of the selection equation (1) and sheds light on what
determines the characteristics and type of bond a financial firm will issue. Columns 1 and
2 report the coefficients and standard errors, respectively, for the overall sample, and they
control for credit risk by RATING whereas the remaining two pairs of columns report the
coefficients and standard errors for the above‐average‐grade HIGHER (AAA to A) and
below‐average‐grade LOWER (A– and lower) bonds, respectively. This partition of the
data into these particular rating bands is dictated by the dearth of financial bonds rated
below investment grade as shown in Table 2a. When we attempt to estimate our models
for the below‐investment‐grade financial bond subsample (BBþ and lower), the selection
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model (1) did not converge and no reliable estimates could be obtained. The regressions
seem to explain the data reasonably well with a pseudoR2 of 82.1% for the overall sample.
Moreover, 8 of 12 coefficients representing hypotheses summarized in Table 1 are
significant for the overall sample. The control variables ISSUE AMOUNT and
MATURITY show that relative to straight bonds, financial callable bond issues are larger
and of a longer scheduled maturity for all regressions.
Economic Environment
Support for the notion that the popularity of the call feature is time varying is provided by
the year dummies. Before the 2000 pivot in the structure of interest rates, the call feature
TABLE 4. Selection Model for Callable and Noncallable Financial Bonds.
Variable All SE HIGHER SE LOWER SE
Constant 5.597 1.601 11.167 25.891 5.282 2.397
LEVEL 0.261 0.138 0.049 0.217 0.703 0.267
SLOPE 0.642 0.151 0.116 0.309 0.816 0.249
VOLATILITY 0.002 0.021 0.006 0.046 0.033 0.030
CREDIT SPREAD 0.336 0.060 0.454 0.096 0.151 0.091
SHELF 1.422 0.257 3.181 0.493 0.915 0.396
PRIVATE 0.548 0.362 N/A N/A 0.583 0.473
SIZE 0.018 0.032 0.159 0.045 0.056 0.054
ROA 0.169 0.019 0.194 0.034 0.169 0.026
RATING 0.048 0.020 N/A N/A N/A N/A
SECURITY 0.821 0.203 1.337 4.305 0.742 0.234
RESTRICT 1.361 0.195 2.972 0.345 0.213 0.279
COMPETITIVE 1.207 0.091 N/A N/A 11.867 0.528
ISSUE AMOUNT 0.069 0.030 0.168 0.052 0.074 0.045
MATURITY 2.155 0.083 2.101 0.151 2.141 0.123
Y95 1.912 0.324 3.016 0.578 0.024 0.632
Y96 1.466 0.329 2.350 0.595 0.513 0.613
Y97 1.485 0.296 3.494 0.571 0.259 0.539
Y98 2.017 0.240 1.945 0.358 1.924 0.551
Y99 1.381 0.229 1.510 0.379 1.618 0.613
Y01 0.121 0.371 0.720 0.644 0.488 0.715
Y02 1.501 0.505 1.239 1.155 1.305 0.770
Y03 1.001 0.534 1.980 1.374 1.079 0.767
Y04 0.320 0.497 0.969 1.245 0.826 0.715
Y05 0.228 0.318 0.128 0.779 1.035 0.546
Y06 0.512 0.251 1.347 0.447 0.601 0.611
N 3,175 1,829 1,346
Case correct 2,995 1,776 1,241
Number callable 2,087
Pseudo‐R2 0.821 0.899 0.792
Note: This table reports the results of a probit regression of callable versus noncallable financial bonds on variables
that determine the popularity of ordinary callable and noncallable bonds. All variables are defined in Table 3.
HIGHER and LOWER are higher (AAA to A) and lower (A– and lower) grade bonds, respectively. SE is standard
error.
Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 5% level.
Significant at the 10% level.
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was relatively unpopular but after that point there is modest evidence that the call feature
is more popular. The first five variables, fromLEVEL to SHELF, examine the influence of
the economic environment on bond issue choice. Overall, four of the five proxies for the
economic environment are statistically significant. The lower the level and slope of the
term structure and the narrower the credit spread, the more likely it is that financial
callable bonds are issued. Moreover, financial callable bonds are more likely to be issued
via shelf prospectus. Evidently, the popularity of callable bonds does vary as the
economic environment changes and financial firms do tend to issue callable bonds using
a process that allows them to conveniently respond to changes in the economic
environment.
We note that Kish and Livingston (1992) and Güntay, Prabhala, and Unal (2002)
find evidence that the popularity of call features increases with the level of interest rates,
whereas Sarkar (2001) finds that the popularity of call features decreases in the level and
volatility of interest rates. We later discover that the statistically significant inverse
relation between the popularity of callable bonds and the level of interest rates is confined
to the finance industry. Therefore, a likely reason why Güntay, Prabhala, and Unal find a
different relation is because they examine nonfinancial bonds only, and Kish and
Livingston (1992) combine financial and nonfinancial bonds in different portions than we
do, leading to contradictory results. Also, Sarkar (2001) and Kish and Livingston (1992)
do not adjust for time‐series effects.
Within broad credit partitions, we find that support for the economic environment
hypothesis is strongest in the lower partition of credit ratings. Specifically, the popularity
of lower grade financial callable bonds decreases in the level and slope of the term
structure and credit spreads and are more likely than noncallable bonds to be issued via
shelf prospectus. Still, the economic environment hypothesis receives support for higher
rated financial bonds as well, as higher rated financial callable bonds are more likely
issued via a shelf prospectus when the credit spread narrows.
Agency Problems
Firms that suffer most from agency problems are expected to be smaller, lower rated, and
modestly profitable and have restricted access to capital, and therefore they tend to issue
bonds privately. Moreover, if callable bonds are used to respond to agency problems,
callable bonds should contain restrictive covenants and stronger security features that can
further mitigate agency problems. Overall, Table 4 shows that that lower rated (RATING)
and less profitable (ROA) financial firms do tend to issue callable bonds with stronger
SECURITY covenants. However, if callable bonds are a response to agency problems,
one would expect that the bond will contain restrictive covenants in an attempt to control
agency issues. In fact, we find the opposite as callable financial bonds are less likely to
contain restrictive covenants (RESTRICT).
Looking at the results by broad rating partitions, we find there is more consistent
support for the agency theoretic explanation for issuing callable bonds for lower rated
financial bonds. Specifically, lower rated financial callable bonds are sold by less
profitable (ROA) financial firms that are more likely to contain stronger SECURITY
covenants. Still, lower rated callable financial bonds are more likely to be issued by
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COMPETITIVE bids. If callable bonds are a response to agency problems, one would
expect the bond to be issued via negotiation rather than by competition so this suggests
that at least some investors are sanguine about potential agency problems for lower rated
financial bonds. Meanwhile, consistent with agency theory, higher rated financial callable
bonds are sold by smaller (SIZE), less profitable financial firms. Inconsistent with agency
theory, however, these higher rated callable bonds are unlikely to contain restrictive
covenants.
This mixed support for agency theory is consistent with the literature that uses
similar proxies. Consistent with agency theory, Banko and Zhou (2010) and Kish and
Livingston (1992) find that smaller and lower rated bonds are more likely to contain a call
feature. However, inconsistent with agency theory, Banko and Zhou find that more
profitable nonfinancial firms, particularly those with a moderate rating, are more likely to
issue callable bonds. Although we find that less profitable financial firms are more likely
to issue callable bonds, we always find that at least one secondary characteristic of
financial callable bonds, such as the use of restrictive covenants or the type of issue
process, does not support agency theory.
Offer Spreads
Table 5 reports the results of the offer spread equation (2) and sheds light on what
determines the offer spread for financial bonds. Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients
and standard errors, respectively, for the overall sample and controls for credit risk by
RATING, and the remaining two sets of columns report the coefficients and standard
errors for the higher (AAA to A) and lower (A– and lower) grade bonds, respectively. One
can judge the economic significance of each coefficient by noting that the coefficients are
denominated in percent. For example, an issue via shelf registration (SHELF) can save an
extra 40.3 basis points on average relative to all other issues.
We control for time effects by including year dummies. This allows us to examine
the overall influence of the economic environment and agency theory on the average offer
spread on callable and noncallable bonds. Figure II shows that relative to the pivot dates of
2000 and 2007, interest rates were lower. This is reflected in the structure of the year
dummies, which shows that offer spreads were generally lower relative to these dates and
significantly so before the year 2000 pivot date.
A special feature of (2) is the inverse Mills ratio coefficient, which adjusts for self‐
selection bias. In the case offinancial bonds, the inverseMills ratio ismarginally significant.
Once the effect of self‐selection is accounted for, the CALLABLE coefficient means that
issuers of callable bonds must pay a premium of 48 basis points for the flexibility to call the
bond before maturity. This clearly suggests that investors demand and receive
compensation for call risk, as suggested by financial theory. The call premium is highly
significant for higher and lower rated bonds and indicates that call premiums are lower for
higher rated bonds. This is in contrast to Ederington and Stock (2002), who find that the call
premium is insignificant and of the wrong sign in explaining corporate bond yields.
However, we later replicate Ederington and Stock’s findings for our nonfinancial sample.
Nine of the remaining 14 slope coefficients are statistically significant. The offer
spread decreases in RATING but increases in restrictive covenants (RESTRICT). The
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later coefficient suggests that investors recognize that restrictions are an imperfect
solution to a problem of concern to investors and therefore require a higher offer spread
despite their inclusion in the bond contract. Consistent with our results, Ederington
and Stock (2002) generally find that yield spreads increase for lower rated nonfinancial
bonds.
Employing a competitive bid (COMPETITIVE) and issuing via a shelf
prospectus (SHELF) reduce the offer spread. Firms with higher debt burdens (TDR)
pay a higher offer spread, but firms with higher liquidity (QR) also pay a higher offer
spread. The latter result is not surprising as an increase in the quick ratio also implies that a
larger portion of the financial firm’s income‐producing assets are tied up in low‐yield
assets. This raises the possibility that the firm is experiencing difficulty competing in its
TABLE 5. Offer Spreads for Callable and Noncallable Financial Bonds.
Variable All SE HIGHER SE LOWER SE
Constant 2.795 0.683 1.171 0.516 3.476 0.984
SECURITY 0.049 0.104 0.020 0.049 0.117 0.124
RESTRICT 0.404 0.103 0.289 0.140 0.457 0.188
RATING 0.175 0.006 N/A N/A N/A N/A
SHELF 0.403 0.147 0.078 0.101 0.752 0.337
PRIVATE 0.100 0.218 N/A N/A 0.280 0.417
COMPETITIVE 1.678 0.160 N/A N/A 1.478 0.338
SIZE 0.008 0.011 0.002 0.014 0.112 0.038
TDR 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.001
QR 0.013 0.006 0.056 0.008 0.031 0.014
ROA 0.002 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.000 0.026
LEVEL 0.044 0.041 0.189 0.050 0.346 0.101
SLOPE 0.130 0.045 0.005 0.049 0.471 0.114
VOLATILITY 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.011
CREDIT SPREAD 0.169 0.025 0.170 0.037 0.160 0.034
CALLABLE 0.480 0.072 0.256 0.089 0.695 0.106
MILLSOC 0.071 0.042 0.016 0.065 0.067 0.062
Y95 0.373 0.076 0.383 0.087 0.487 0.372
Y96 0.303 0.074 0.342 0.068 0.609 0.369
Y97 0.250 0.081 0.235 0.085 0.328 0.349
Y98 0.200 0.072 0.026 0.066 0.506 0.334
Y99 0.182 0.069 0.001 0.076 0.460 0.341
Y01 0.195 0.197 0.126 0.241 0.533 0.454
Y02 0.058 0.198 0.021 0.298 0.533 0.448
Y03 0.307 0.171 0.085 0.246 0.707 0.430
Y04 0.223 0.143 0.229 0.202 0.848 0.402
Y05 0.061 0.088 0.026 0.116 0.514 0.343
Y06 0.009 0.036 0.082 0.040 0.772 0.320
N 3,175 1,829 1,346
R2 0.511 0.381 0.465
Note: This table reports the variables that determine the offer spread for new issues of financial callable and
noncallable bonds. The inverseMills ratio (MILLSOC) reports the difference in the offer spread for ordinary callable
bonds relative to noncallable bonds. All variables are defined in Table 3. HIGHER and LOWER are higher (AAA to
A) and lower (A and lower) grade bonds, respectively. SE is standard error.
Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 5% level.
Significant at the 10% level.
Callable and Noncallable Bonds 451
chosen market. Meanwhile, the offer spread increases in CREDIT SPREAD and
VOLATILITY and decreases in the SLOPE of the term structure. Only Ederington and
Stock (2002) look at the influence of level, slope, and volatility of the term structure on
yield spreads. They find that the yield spread is increasing in volatility and decreasing in
the level and slope of the term structure.
When the data are partitioned by broad rating bands, offer spreads on lower rated
bonds are increasing in debt (TDR) and, in contrast to higher rated bonds, decreasing in
liquidity (QR). Interestingly, the offer spread on lower rated bonds is decreasing in firm
SIZE whereas SIZE does not appear to influence the offer spread for the overall sample or
for higher rated bonds. Additionally, offer spreads on lower rated bonds are decreasing
whereas offer spreads on higher rated bonds are increasing in the level of the term
structure. Otherwise, when a coefficient is significant for either the lower or higher rating
partition, it agrees with the overall results.
VI. Selection and Offer Spreads of Nonfinancial Bonds
Table 6 reports the result of the selection equation (1) for nonfinancial bonds. Columns 1
and 2 report the coefficients and standard errors, respectively, for the overall sample and
controls for credit risk by RATING, and the remaining three sets of columns report the
coefficients and standard errors for the high‐investment‐grade HIG (AAA to AA–),
medium‐investment‐grade MIG (Aþ to BBB–), and below‐investment‐grade BIG (BBþ
and lower) bonds, respectively. The regressions seem to explain the data reasonably well
with a pseudo‐R2 of 46.1% for the overall sample. Moreover, 7 of 12 coefficients
representing hypotheses summarized in Table 1 are significant for the overall sample.
Like the earlier financial bond sample, the control variable MATURITY shows that
nonfinancial callable bonds are of a longer scheduled maturity than straight bonds for
nearly all regressions, but in contrast to financial bonds, the control variable ISSUE
AMOUNT shows that callable nonfinancial bonds are smaller than noncallable bonds.
Economic Environment
Support for the notion that the popularity of the call feature is time varying is provided by
the year dummies. Just like the financial bond sample, we find that before the year 2000
pivot in the structure of interest rates, the call feature was relatively unpopular but after
that the popularity of the call feature grew. The first five variables, from LEVEL to
SHELF, examine the influence of the economic environment on bond issue choice.
Overall, three of the five proxies for the economic environment are statistically
significant. Clearly, the wider the credit spread, the more unlikely it is that nonfinancial
callable bonds are issued. Interestingly, like Banko and Zhou (2010) and unlike our
financial bond sample, we find that the popularity of nonfinancial callable bonds is
increasing in interest rate volatility. Meanwhile, nonfinancial callable bonds are like
financial callable bonds in that they are more likely to be issued via shelf prospectus.
Evidently, nonfinancial firms issue callable bonds using a process that enhances their
ability to respond to changes in the cost and benefits of the callable feature.
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Within broad credit ratings, however, we only find support for the economic
environment hypothesis for high‐investment‐grade bonds. Specifically, the popularity of
high‐investment‐grade nonfinancial callable bonds decreases in the slope of the term
structure and the credit spread and the callable bonds are more likely than noncallable
bonds to be issued via shelf prospectus. Like Banko and Zhou (2010), we find that the
popularity of callable bonds increasing in volatility is strongest for medium‐investment‐
grade bonds. We find no evidence to support the economic environment hypothesis for
medium‐ and below‐investment‐grade nonfinancial bonds. In fact, below‐investment‐
grade nonfinancial callable bonds are less likely than straight bonds to be issued via a shelf
prospectus. This suggests that some motivation other than a change in the economic
environment is driving the popularity for issuing below‐investment‐grade callable
nonfinancial bonds.
TABLE 6. Selection Model for Callable and Noncallable Nonfinancial Bonds.
Variable All SE HIG SE MIG SE BIG SE
Constant 3.599 1.054 2.668 5.012 0.499 2.025 2.394 2.689
LEVEL 0.056 0.117 0.696 0.448 0.200 0.202 0.027 0.284
SLOPE 0.199 0.124 0.843 0.449 0.135 0.258 0.116 0.288
VOLATILITY 0.033 0.019 0.029 0.066 0.056 0.034 0.044 0.054
CREDIT SPREAD 0.160 0.054 0.285 0.158 0.150 0.101 0.042 0.162
SHELF 0.257 0.116 2.889 0.504 0.317 0.295 0.691 0.250
PRIVATE 0.053 0.135 N/A N/A 0.595 0.360 0.171 0.274
SIZE 0.002 0.024 0.227 0.133 0.192 0.038 0.378 0.056
ROA 0.033 0.007 0.128 0.032 0.005 0.016 0.009 0.009
RATING 0.137 0.014 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SECURITY 0.047 0.080 0.622 0.493 0.485 0.172 0.036 0.159
RESTRICT 0.438 0.099 0.616 0.376 0.191 0.201 0.750 0.260
COMPETITIVE 0.495 0.262 3.282 3.292 0.695 0.516 0.984 0.532
ISSUE AMOUNT 0.352 0.022 0.228 0.058 0.330 0.052 0.180 0.106
MATURITY 0.754 0.059 1.613 0.236 1.029 0.110 0.981 0.194
Y95 1.183 0.278 1.402 1.056 1.292 0.481 0.056 0.724
Y96 0.804 0.260 2.163 1.087 1.330 0.470 0.477 0.628
Y97 0.796 0.234 0.766 0.715 1.966 0.499 0.596 0.568
Y98 0.951 0.197 2.590 0.761 0.861 0.333 0.171 0.497
Y99 0.551 0.230 0.604 0.935 0.608 0.404 0.823 0.552
Y01 1.279 0.270 2.108 0.771 0.168 0.730 0.925 0.740
Y02 1.249 0.350 2.240 1.044 0.011 0.852 0.312 0.907
Y03 0.879 0.392 0.899 1.223 0.213 0.912 0.107 0.928
Y04 0.480 0.375 0.073 1.406 0.184 0.812 0.366 0.853
Y05 0.264 0.258 1.245 1.103 0.318 0.473 0.847 0.583
Y06 0.664 0.228 0.537 0.786 0.763 0.381 0.741 0.547
N 2,601 523 1,688 390
Case correct 2,264 497 1,615 297
Number callable 661
Pseudo‐R2 0.461 0.869 0.644 0.360
Note: This table reports the results of a probit regression of callable versus noncallable nonfinancial bonds on
variables that determine the popularity of ordinary callable and noncallable bonds. HIG, MIG, and BIG are higher
(AAA to AA–), medium (Aþ to BBB–), and below investment (BBþ and lower) grade bonds. SE is standard error.
All variables are defined in Table 3.
Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 5% level.
Significant at the 10% level.
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Agency Problems
Overall, Table 6 shows that that low‐rated (RATING) nonfinancial firms tend to issue
callable bonds with restrictive covenants (RESTRICT). However, all other characteristics
of nonfinancial callable bonds do not support, and in some cases refute, the hypothesis
that callable bonds are used to respond to agency problems. Callable bonds are more
likely to be issued by more profitable rather than less profitable firms (ROA) that are
thought to be less prone to agency problems. Moreover, if callable bonds are a response to
agency problems, one would expect that the bond would be issued via negotiation as
investors would wish to discuss the details of the bond covenants to secure protection
from potential agency problems. Instead, nonfinancial callable bonds are more likely to be
issued via COMPETITIVE bids, suggesting there is a pool of investors that are sanguine
about the prospect of agency problems.
Looking at the results by broad rating bands, we find that although high‐ and
medium‐investment‐grade nonfinancial callable bonds show mixed support, there is
stronger support for below‐investment‐grade bonds for the agency theoretic explanation
for issuing callable bonds. Specifically, below‐investment‐grade callable bonds are sold
by smaller nonfinancial firms (SIZE) that are more likely to contain restrictive covenants
(RESTRICT). Only one coefficient is inconsistent with agency theory. Specifically,
below‐investment‐grade bonds are more likely to be issued by COMPETITIVE bids.
Meanwhile, more profitable (ROA) and larger (SIZE) firms are more likely to issue high‐
and medium‐investment‐grade callable bonds, respectively. This mixed support for
agency theoretic explanations is consistent with the literature that uses similar proxies.
Consistent with agency theory, Banko and Zhou (2010) and Kish and Livingston (1992)
also find that smaller and lower rated bonds are more likely to contain a call feature.
However, inconsistent with agency theory, Banko and Zhou find that more profitable
firms, particularly those with a moderate rating, are more likely to issue callable bonds.
Offer Spreads
Table 7 reports the result of the offer spread equation (2) and sheds light on what
determines the offer spread for nonfinancial bonds. Columns 1 and 2 report the
coefficients and standard errors, respectively, for the overall sample and controls for credit
risk by RATING, and the remaining three sets of columns report the coefficients and
standard errors for high‐investment‐grade (HIG; AAA to AA–), medium‐investment‐
grade (MIG; Aþ to BBB–), and below‐investment‐grade (BIG; BBþ and lower)
bonds, respectively. Like Table 5, the coefficients are denominated in percent. Also like
Table 5, we control for time effects by including year dummies. Figure II shows that
relative to the pivot years of 2000 and 2007, interest rates were lower. This is reflected in
the structure of year dummies that shows that offer spreads were generally lower relative
to these dates.
A special feature of (2) is the inverseMills ratio coefficient, which adjusts for self‐
selection bias. In the case of nonfinancial bonds, the inverse Mills ratio is highly
significant. In contrast to the financial bond sample, the CALLABLE coefficient is not
statistically significant. Ederington and Stock (2002) also find that the call premium is
insignificant and of the wrong sign in explaining corporate bond yields.
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Six of the remaining 14 slope coefficients are statistically significant. The offer
spread decreases in RATING. Ederington and Stock (2002) also generally find that yield
spreads decrease for higher rated bonds. Employing a competitive bid (COMPETITIVE)
reduces the offer spread but offering the bond as a PRIVATE issue requires a higher offer
spread. Firms with higher liquidity (QR) pay a lower offer spread. Meanwhile the offer
spread increases in CREDIT SPREAD. It is notable that once we include time dummies
the LEVEL, SLOPE, and VOLATILITY of the term structure are insignificant. Only
Ederington and Stock look at the influence of level, slope, and volatility of the term
structure on yield spreads and find that the yield spread is increasing in volatility and
decreasing in the level and slope of the term structure. However, they do not control for
time effects.
TABLE 7. Offer Spreads for Callable and Noncallable Nonfinancial Bonds.
Variable All SE HIG SE MIG SE BIG SE
Constant 4.223 0.516 0.426 0.691 2.670 0.525 2.066 3.098
SECURITY 0.069 0.046 0.130 0.037 0.017 0.052 0.402 0.151
RESTRICT 0.054 0.038 0.167 0.067 0.216 0.032 0.291 0.296
RATING 0.190 0.009 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SHELF 0.151 0.065 0.483 0.097 0.109 0.068 0.613 0.315
PRIVATE 0.651 0.083 N/A N/A 0.853 0.086 0.676 0.298
COMPETITIVE 0.411 0.181 0.544 0.084 0.113 0.108 0.827 0.543
SIZE 0.002 0.013 0.036 0.023 0.023 0.011 0.244 0.093
TDR 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002
QR 0.018 0.005 0.037 0.067 0.002 0.004 0.151 0.073
ROA 0.006 0.005 0.021 0.009 0.010 0.004 0.025 0.011
LEVEL 0.086 0.058 0.221 0.073 0.242 0.045 0.282 0.474
SLOPE 0.068 0.073 0.258 0.078 0.032 0.054 0.593 0.442
VOLATILITY 0.014 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.021 0.009 0.061 0.079
CREDIT SPREAD 0.160 0.027 0.116 0.044 0.183 0.023 0.238 0.186
CALLABLE 0.103 0.083 0.024 0.085 0.082 0.092 0.112 0.223
MILLSOC 0.210 0.027 0.153 0.019 0.150 0.021 0.554 0.276
Y95 0.416 0.156 0.261 0.157 0.207 0.102 0.407 1.244
Y96 0.320 0.156 0.347 0.175 0.291 0.100 0.404 1.159
Y97 0.368 0.132 0.196 0.130 0.166 0.097 0.308 1.029
Y98 0.179 0.091 0.164 0.092 0.193 0.083 0.041 0.617
Y99 0.017 0.112 0.013 0.098 0.065 0.097 0.196 0.852
Y01 0.530 0.159 0.421 0.184 0.482 0.159 0.817 0.964
Y02 0.526 0.217 0.481 0.225 0.517 0.227 0.623 1.287
Y03 0.573 0.254 0.164 0.296 1.027 0.250 0.480 1.278
Y04 0.357 0.242 0.043 0.309 0.965 0.207 0.141 1.114
Y05 0.125 0.153 0.327 0.160 0.621 0.133 1.368 0.663
Y06 0.009 0.117 0.118 0.117 0.222 0.136 0.906 0.560
N 2,601 523 1,688 390
R2 0.502 0.121 0.379 0.177
Note: This table reports the variables that determine the offer spread for new issues of nonfinancial callable and
noncallable bonds. The inverseMills ratio (MILLSOC) reports the difference in the offer spread for ordinary callable
bond relative to noncallable bonds. HIG, MIG, and BIG are higher (AAA to AA–), medium (Aþ to BBB–), and
below investment (BBþ and lower) grade bonds. SE is standard error. All variables are defined in Table 3.
Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 5% level.
Significant at the 10% level.
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We comment only on the differences from our main results when examining the
results stratified by broad rating bands. For the highest credit quality bonds, offer spreads
decrease in SECURITY but for below‐investment‐grade bonds, the offer spread increases
in SECURITY. This suggests that provision of security for lower rated bonds is a
necessity to issue a bond rather than a concession given to reduce funding costs.
Restrictive covenants (RESTRICT) are costly for investment‐grade bonds, suggesting
that these covenants do not fully resolve agency problems. Larger nonfinancial firms
(SIZE) can issue medium‐ and below‐investment‐grade bonds at a cheaper cost,
indicating that investors do account for firm size when investing in lower rated bonds.
Also, for below‐investment‐grade bonds, the offer spreads decrease in profitability (ROA)
and liquidity (QR) but increase in leverage (TDR), clearly indicating that the financial
condition of the firm is of significant interest to investors. This result is consistent with
Ederington and Stock (2002) who find that the yield spread is decreasing in ROA for
medium‐ and below‐investment‐grade bonds. Finally, the economic environment has
a significant impact on the offer spreads of medium‐investment‐grade nonfinancial
bonds after accounting for the effect of time trends. Specifically, offer spreads are
decreasing in the LEVEL and VOLATILITY of interest rates but increasing in the
CREDIT SPREAD.
VII. Call Spreads
The final step is to examine the components of the call spread. To accomplish this task, we
compute the difference in the offer spreads of pairs of callable and noncallable bonds. We
always match by the exact same day of issue and by the industry category (financial and
nonfinancial) and then by closest issue size, if possible. We find 270 matched pairs
of callable and noncallable same‐industry bonds and then estimate the following
regression:
ðYCt  YNCtÞ ¼ Constantþ bLEVELt þ bSLOPEt þ bVOLATILITYt
þbDCREDIT SPREADt þ bDISSUE AMOUNTt þ bDMATURITYt
þbDRATINGt þ bDSECURITYt þ bDRESTRICTt þ bDSHELFt
þbDPRIVATEt þ bDSIZEt þ bDROAt þ bDTDRt þ bDQRt
þbYXXt þ et: ð3Þ
Note that (3) contains virtually all the variables in (1) and (2) as they all can
potentially explain the difference between the offer spread on a callable and a matched
noncallable bond.6 Other than the Treasury term structure variables, specifically LEVEL,
6The sole exception is COMPETITIVE, where the differences in the matched bonds rarely gave a value
different from zero.
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SLOPE, and VOLATILITY, and the year dummies, the variables are computed as the
difference between the callable and noncallable bonds.
Table 8 reports the results of (3). As the LEVEL of the term structure and as
interest rate implied VOLATILITY increase, call premiums increase, as suggested by
option pricing theory. Call premiums increase in MATURITY and in stronger
SECURITY and decrease in credit RATING.
These results are consistent with the recent literature. Like our results, Samet and
Obey (2014) find that call yields decrease in the rating. Specifically, Samet and Obey find
that the call premium on below‐investment‐grade bonds is approximately 40 basis points
higher than investment‐grade bonds, and Table 8 reports that the call premium on lower
rated bonds is 14.6 basis points higher than on higher rated bonds. Also like our
results, Kim and Stock (2014) find that yield spreads increase in volatility for both
TABLE 8. Analysis of Call Spreads.
Variable Coefficient SE
Constant 3.958 1.739
LEVEL 0.390 0.233
SLOPE 0.083 0.262
VOLATILITY 0.070 0.022
Difference in CREDIT SPREAD 0.009 0.169
Difference in ISSUE AMOUNT 0.000 0.000
Difference in MATURITY 0.020 0.008
Difference in RATING 0.146 0.022
Difference in SECURITY 0.258 0.151
Difference in RESTRICT 0.249 0.180
Difference in SHELF 0.477 0.317
Difference in PRIVATE 0.125 0.457
Difference in SIZE 0.000 0.000
Difference in ROA 0.009 0.020
Difference in TDR 0.006 0.004
Difference in QR 0.002 0.015
Y95 0.572 0.597
Y96 1.586 0.613
Y97 0.873 0.638
Y98 1.202 0.734
Y99 1.039 0.606
Y01 1.028 1.011
Y02 2.229 1.026
Y03 1.576 1.140
Y04 1.416 1.016
Y05 1.471 0.699
Y06 1.220 0.583
N 270
R2 0.294
Note: This table regresses the difference in offer spreads between matched pairs of same date and industry (financial
or nonfinancial) new issues of callable bonds with noncallable bonds. SE is standard error.
Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 5% level.
Significant at the 10% level.
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callable and noncallable bonds, and the effect of volatility on bond yields is weaker for
callable bonds.
VIII. Conclusions
Our findings imply that answers to the questions raised in the Introduction do vary by
industry. For financial bonds: (1) The popularity of callable bonds is influenced by
changes in the term structure and the credit spread and are more likely to be issued via a
shelf prospectus. (2) Callable bonds are unlikely to contain restrictive covenants, a
characteristic that is not consistent with agency theory. (3) Firms that choose to issue
callable bonds must pay a premium relative to straight bonds for the call feature. For
nonfinancial bonds: (1) Only highly rated callable bonds are influenced by the credit
spread and are more likely to be issued via a shelf prospectus. (2) Inconsistent with agency
theory, more profitable firms sell high‐investment‐grade bonds and larger firms sell
medium‐investment‐grade callable bonds. In contrast, smaller firms issue below‐
investment‐grade callable bonds with restrictive covenants. Still, these firms issue these
bonds via competitive bids. (3) We are unable to find a statistically significant call
premium for nonfinancial callable bonds. Overall, we contribute to the understanding of
the selection of the call feature, on the determinate of offer spreads of callable and
noncallable financial and nonfinancial corporate bonds, and on the determinate of the call
premium—an important corporate finance issue.
In more detail, we find that the motivation for issuing callable as opposed to
noncallable bonds varies by industry. Controlling for annual time effects, we discover that
the popularity of callable bonds relative to noncallable bonds is related to the economic
environment more for financial than for nonfinancial firms. For financial firms, new issues
of callable bonds decrease in the level and slope of the term structure and in the credit
spread, using issue procedures that allow the firm to conveniently respond to changes in
the economic environment. In contrast, only high‐investment‐grade nonfinancial callable
bonds decrease in the credit spread using convenient issue procedures.
We find mixed support for agency explanations for issuing higher credit quality
callable bonds and more consistent support for firms that issue lower credit quality
callable bonds. If callable bonds are used to alleviate agency problems, we would expect
that firms subject to severe agency problems would be more likely to issue callable bonds
with secondary characteristics designed to alleviate agency problems. Contrary to agency
theory, we find that more profitable and larger nonfinancial firms are more likely to issue
high‐investment‐grade and medium‐investment‐grade nonfinancial callable bonds,
respectively. Similarly, higher credit quality financial callable bonds are unlikely to
contain restrictive covenants. However, the issuer and issue characteristics of lower grade
bonds are more in line with agency theory. Specifically, smaller nonfinancial firms issue
below‐investment‐grade callable bonds with restrictive covenants that can further
alleviate agency problems. Moreover, less profitable financial firms are more likely to
issue lower rated callable bonds with stronger security. Still, both financial and
nonfinancial lower rated callable bonds are more likely sold by competitive bids,
suggesting there are investors who are sanguine about agency issues.
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